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Following Professor Homer Kripke's stinging dissent from the
report of the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure,'
further exposition and expansion of his views were eagerly awaited
by many. Publication of The SEC and Corporate Disclosure:
Regulation in Search of a Purpose2 must be welcomed by those
who share his concerns. The work offers a thorough examination
of the corporate disclosure activities of the SEC by one who has
spent the bulk of a long and distinguished career in the analysis of
the securities laws from both an academic and a practical perspective. In large measure, the conclusion of his inquiry must be seen
as frustration and disappointment with the current disclosure practices of the Commission.
Professor Kripke presents four central themes. First, he argues
that the SEC, or its staff, has developed its own internal sense of
the purpose to be served by corporate disclosure and, disregarding
the statutory limits on its jurisdiction, has been overly zealous in
attempting to achieve that self-defined purpose. He argues persuasively that the Commission's staff has come to view firm-oriented,
historical information of the sort required to be disclosed by
schedule A to the Securities Act of 1933 3 as the critical element in
any investment decision. He then asserts that the staff not only
operates under this misconception of what is important, but also
defends it unduly in efforts to make corporate issuers, and those
who trade in securities, abide closely by the SEC's views, whether
or not those views have any practical importance to investment
f Member, California Bar. A.B. 1967, Occidental College; J.D. 1970, University
of Michigan.
1 ADvisoRY ComM. ON ComoRAE DiscLosum, 95TH CoNG., IsT SEss., REPORT
or TmE ADvisoRY Coamm. ON CoRPORATE DiSCLOSURE TO THE SECURMTES AN
EXCHANGE CO--siouN (Comm. Print 1977). Professor Kripke's dissent appears
in volume 1 at D-49 to D-56.
2 H. KRiip E, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGu.ATIoN IN SEARcH
OF A PURPOSE (1979).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976).
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decisions or firm foundation in the securities laws. Professor Kripke
demonstrates forcefully that, with some surprising, but relatively
limited, support from the courts, the Commission has tended to
adopt and adhere tenaciously to quite attenuated interpretations of
statutory language in order to enforce policy decisions often reached
without sufficient basis.
To take a minor but perhaps useful example, Professor Kripke
points out that, under section 15(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,4 the Commission may revoke or suspend the registration of a broker-dealer who "willfully" makes a false or misleading
statement or omission in an application or report to the Commission." But the SEC has quite clearly, and fairly successfully, established the view that "willfully" means nothing more than that the
actor was aware of his actions and imposes no requirement of
knowledge of impropriety. 6 Under that view, one "willfully" makes
a false statement if he willingly makes a statement that in fact is
untrue, regardless whether he knew or even could have known that
it was untrue or that anyone would rely upon it. That point was
made manifest to me by the Commission staff in a recent proceeding involving a broker-dealer. In discussions of a potential consent
order to be executed by my client, the staff advised that it would
take the position that my client had violated the law and could be
sanctioned-even though the staff was not sure that it could develop
sufficient facts to make a finding of gross negligence or of scienter,
but could "only" find a "willful" violation. It is all very well for
Humpty Dumpty to take the view that a word "means just what I
choose it to mean-neither more nor less," 7 but certainly something
better is to be expected of a regulatory agency with the deserved
prestige of the SEC.8 Professor Kripke accurately observes that
such a view is symptomatic of the extent to which the staff of the
SEC has been infected with zealotry in attacking practices that, for
one reason or another, it has determined to be improper. And too
often, the determination of impropriety is reached without legislative or judicial sanction.
In his second theme, Professor Kripke makes the point that the
SEC has given too little attention to the kind of information that
41Id. §78o(b) (4).
5 H. KRwiKE, supra note 2, at 51-52.

6Id.52.
7Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, in Tns
ANNOTATED ALicE 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960).
8
In fairness to the Commission, it must be observed that its definition of
"willfl," though dubious, has support in the cases. See, e.g., Tager v. SEC, 344
F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).

BOOK REVIEW

1263

investors actually desire and has not adequately considered whether
and to what extent market forces alone can make available the
truly important information concerning an issuer of securities.
Fearful of criticism from unsuccessful investors, the Commission has
assumed a defensive posture, transforming "the prospectus into a
pessimistic litany and [excluding] unverifiable material, particularly
forecasts and other estimates." 9 Professor Kripke argues persuasively, for example, that the SEC's recent and limited acceptance
of projections in offering documents should have occurred years
ago-as he was himself arguing then 10--because this is precisely the
sort of information that an investor can use."1 Furthermore, there
are many types of market information far more significant than that
oriented toward the particular issuer, and the SEC has given extremely little attention to the question how to ensure that such
information-relating, for instance, to industrywide economic analyses-is transmitted to the investor. Although he, and others, took
hope in the early days of the Advisory Committee that it would
analyze thoroughly the true utility of the present mandatory disclosure system, he finds that the apparent need for reexamination
was ignored. He concludes that the SEC, now with the blessing of
the Advisory Committee, has allowed itself to be locked into a
conceptual framework of disclosure that is far too limited and far
too removed from the actual needs of the investor in the market.
As enforced by the Commission, the present disclosure system tends
to ignore that the investor typically does not decide whether to
invest, but rather decides in what to invest. Similarly, the present
disclosure system ignores, at least in Professor Kripke's view, the
role of investment analysis, the implications of random walk/efficient
market theories, and, in general, the work of the economists who
have examined the securities analysis field during the past several
years.
Third, Professor Kripke argues that the SEC has abdicated
what may be its most important function, the regulation of matters
of accounting, by deferring to the accounting profession to establish
appropriate procedures. It is certainly true that financial statements represent, for a reasonable investor, one of the most significant sources of information about a company. Particularly in
recent years, however, there have been substantial disputes about
9H. KnwKx, supra note 2, at 16.
10 See, e.g., Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1197-1201 (1970).
11 H. KYrSPE, supra note 2, at 17.
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the proper method of preparing and presenting various types of
information in financial statements. And the SEC has preferred to
take a rear seat in these discussions and to ask the accounting profession itself to determine what is appropriate. Notwithstanding
his general dissatisfaction with the recent pattern of activities of
the SEC, and perhaps because of his unyielding confidence in the
Commission's beneficial potential, Professor Kripke presents a forceful case (although not for the first time) 12 that this is an area in
which the SEC should be at the forefront, making decisions to improve accounting disclosure, rather than leaving the matter to the
accounting profession.
Finally, Professor Kripke argues that the SEC, as is perhaps
normal for a bureaucracy with a wide mandate, has taken an overly
broad view of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Congress.
Specifically, the SEC has created limitations on the statutory exemptions from registration under the 1983 Act that may or may not
be sound policy, but that cannot be legitimated under the language
of the statute.' 3 For example, the various restrictions that have
been imposed on unregistered resales of securities by persons who
acquired the securities in a private placement-relating to such
matters as the timing, volume, and method of sale-are simply not
to be found in, or even fairly inferred from, any of the provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933.1- However wise the policy basis for
those limitations (wisdom which Professor Kripke does not necessarily concede), the statute cannot justify their imposition by the
SEC.
Of similar nature, although occurring after the publication of
Professor Kripke's book, are the SEC's new rules regarding tender
offers. 15 In the release adopting those rules, the Commission
freely admits that some of their provisions are inconsistent with
the and-takeover laws of some states and takes the position that,
as a result, the state laws have been preempted by the SEC's exercise of jurisdiction. 16 This notion of agency preemption of
12 See Kripke, supra note 10, at 1175-1204.
33H. KnuxE, supra note 2, at 232-65.
'4 Id. 243-65.
15 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240 (1980).
16 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326,
70,329-30 (1979). The Commission's position has already come under challenge.
See Ohio v. SEC, No. C-2-80-111 (S.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 15, 1980). The complaint
of the Ohio Commissioner of Securities, seeking a declaration that the Ohio Tender
Offer Act, Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1979), is not invalidated
by the federal tender offer regulations, appears at [Current Volume] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 197,286 (1980).
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state law seems rather novel. Although I do not purport here
to examine the constitutional issues in any depth, I must question
this assertion that an administrative agency has the clear authority
to preempt state law. Certainly, if an agency concludes that it
has such authority, it has an obligation to make a clear case for its
view and to do more than merely assert it. Nonetheless, under
the new rules, persons involved in some tender offers will have to
violate either federal law or state law; until the matter has been
judicially resolved, at least some tender offerors will be forced to
act at considerable peril.
Professor Kripke's book has much to commend it, and, indeed,
it is difficult to disagree with most of his views. As is typical of
him, he thoroughly substantiates his arguments and evenhandedly
examines them. In the matter of the Commission's delegation
of authority to accounting boards, Professor Kripke is of course
the acknowledged expert. And because his exploration of this
issue probably represents the most important of the four themes
just summarized, it is somewhat unfair not to dwell on it further.
Yet a reviewer invariably focuses on the issue with which he has
some disagreement. Thus, I shall concentrate primarily on Professor Kripke's discussion of the propriety and scope of corporate
disclosure requirements. That concentration should not cause the
reader to overlook or underestimate Professor Kripke's powerful
analysis of the accounting issues. The only respects in which I
might question his views about those matters relate to the surprising extent of his confidence in the SEC, and his related lack of
confidence in the professionalism of the accounting authorities.
In two important respects, this work fails, I think, to consider
fully defenses that can be raised for the Commission's current approach to disclosure practices. Although I do not necessarily
believe that those defenses are wholly persuasive, they are worthy
of consideration.
The first defense, which Professor Kripke acknowledges to
some extent in the book itself,'7 is that SEC-mandated disclosure
in its present form is meaningful and beneficial for smaller issuers
that do not have a broad following among securities analysts. Professor Kripke may be correct, although I am not entirely convinced, that the current system performs little or no beneficial
function in the case of the large corporation that is carefully
watched by analysts and enjoys a broad trading market. For those
companies, the standard research reports of the analysts doubtless
17 H. Klm'xK,

supra note 2, at 119, 126, 139.
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tend to be far more useful and more widely circulated than the
mandated disclosure documents filed with the Commission. (There
must, of course, always be some reasonable question about how
much information would be available to the analysts absent the
SEC mandate.) But thousands of smaller companies whose securities are traded in the public markets are not followed by analysts
and are not the subject of frequent research reports. Certainly
securities of these issuers account for a relatively small part of the
trading market, and one might well argue that they alone cannot
warrant so pervasive a regulatory scheme as that presently administered by the SEC. Alternatively, an argument based on precisely
the opposite premise is currently popular-that small issuers are
critical to the growth of the nation, cannot as easily afford SECmandated disclosure, and should therefore be relieved of a substantial part of the burden of that disclosure. Whichever premise
one accepts, it must be conceded that the market is not particularly
efficient as to underpublicized securities, and in many instances the
disclosure mandated by the SEC is likely to be the only information
available for such companies. It is not implausible to suggest,
particularly with regard to small issuers, that currently mandated
disclosure performs precisely the valuable social function for which
it was designed-allowing our securities markets to resemble more
closely the perfect-knowledge assumption of economists.
Furthermore, although Professor Kripke argues that market
forces themselves would bring forth much disclosure, some evidence, including the "going private" phenomenon of recent years,
compels the conclusion that contrary forces do exist in some circumstances. Many issuers-probably the majority-depend upon
the securities markets as a source of future capital, in conjunction
with employee compensation programs, or for other purposes. The
reluctance of most issuers to make projections even after the SEC's
adoption of "safe-harbor" provisions18 suggests, however, that
market forces may cause issuers to amplify what they are required
to file with the SEC, but may not be sufficient to generate disclosure in the first instance. And we cannot ignore that some issuers have decided to withdraw from the public securities markets.
Presumably, for those issuers at least, very little information would
be forthcoming without the compulsion of the securities laws.
This is not to say that Professor Kripke is in error. Certainly
he does not advocate the complete withdrawal of the SEC from the
' 8 See Jansson, Will Earnings Forecasts Ever Get Off Dead Center?, INS-nTTIONxAL IWEsmO1t, Feb. 1980, at 121.
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disclosure process, but rather argues for a fundamental reexamination of the type of disclosure required and of the role of the SEC
as the first-resort disclosure recipient. Moreover, some concerns
mentioned above may well be insufficient to justify the total cost of
any broad-based disclosure system. But it would be a mistake to
revise the present system substantially with an eye only upon those
issuers who enjoy an active trading market and a concomitant,
broad following by analysts and who appear inclined to initiate
significant disclosure without the pressure of the securities laws.
The many small issuers about whom documents filed with the
Commission provide the only source of information may not simply
be ignored, even if the trading in their securities represents but a
small fraction of total market volume.
Professor Kripke's arguments must also be examined in light
of the actual function of disclosure. Arguably, a substantial part of
the purpose of SEC-mandated disclosure is not to make information
available to the public investor, but rather is to affect business behavior generally. Certainly that was not the primary purpose for
adoption of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Quite clearly, they were intended to rekindle confidence in securities markets then in a
shambles. The method chosen was to ensure the full and fair transmission of all relevant information-as then perceived-to potential
investors in order that they might make more reasonable evaluations
in their investment decisions and have the same ability to use information as insiders and others. At least part of the function of
disclosure as originally envisioned, and certainly as presently mandated, is, however, responsive to Justice Brandeis's too-often-quoted
remark that sunlight is "the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman." '9
Anyone who has represented corporate clients in connection
with disclosure matters has seen the disclosure requirement affect
corporate behavior directly. Some years ago, for example, I represented a corporation proposing to issue stock to the public for the
first time. In our examination of the corporate records, we discovered some respects in which the corporation's agreements with
its distributors might have violated the antitrust laws. Disclosure
of the possible violations in the prospectus was obviously required,
and as a direct consequence of that disclosure the corporation revised its distribution agreements to eliminate any question of illegality under the antitrust laws. Similarly, every securities lawyer
19 L. BRA_-Dms, OnMR PEOPLE'S Mo.NEY AND How
(1914).
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has encountered innumerable instances in which proposed transactions between a corporation and its management were canceled
when the latter learned that the nature and amount involved would
have to be disclosed to the public in a 1934 Act filing. Certainly,
use of the disclosure mechanism to improve corporate or managerial
behavior was not the primary purpose for adoption of the Acts.
And just as certainly, recent reliance on the policing capacity of
disclosure to justify management "morality" disclosure-obligatory
disclosure of perfectly legal but "sensitive" payments made in connection with procurement of foreign contracts and the like-has in
some instances been excessive, with potentially unfortunate consequences the extent of which has not yet been fully appreciated."
But that this is a real and forceful aspect of securities law disclosure
obligations cannot be ignored.
Let us dwell a bit longer on the capacity to control behavior
as a justification for the disclosure process because, although it is
barely discussed in Professor Kripke's work, it may be the best
defense of the current process. That is not to say that regulation
of behavior is necessarily good, nor that it is sufficient reason to
retain the mechanism in its present form. Clearly, it is no justification at all for failing to improve the process to provide the sort
of disclosure that Professor Kripke sees as necessary in the modern
environment. Nonetheless, it has become an intrinsic part of the
function of disclosure in today's corporate world, and so it must be
reckoned with. Professor Kripke's book may fairly be criticized for
only indirectly examining this aspect of the function of disclosurebut I should hasten to add that, in my view, such an examination
would only underscore the conclusions he has reached.
If obligatory disclosure really promised no more than the conveyance of information-if the SEC were actually to permit any
conduct as long as it was properly disclosed-then the recent debate
over "federal incorporation" might never have materialized. That
debate, triggered or at least substantially magnified by Professor
Cary,21 seems to have three camps. One, generally characterized as
the "extreme left" (although I believe mistakenly so), appears to
urge adoption of a federal incorporation statute to replace the state
corporation laws. Its members seem generally to believe that the
multiplicity of state laws, coupled with the corporation's freedom
20See Lome, The Impending Raid on Your Private Life, WHARITO- MAGAZINE,
Winter, 1979, at 41.
21 See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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to incorporate under any law it chooses and to change the jurisdiction of its incorporation when expedient, is senseless. Underlying this argument, more or less explicitly, is typically the view
that the states have not adequately controlled corporations and have
thereby forfeited their right to grant corporate charters. This camp
apparently assumes that federal incorporation would necessarily give
the SEC substantive power over corporate behavior and eliminate
the charade of using the disclosure mechanism.
For example, when the phenomenon of "going private" was
young, private litigants asserted-generally successfully until the
Supreme Court heard the issues in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green 2 2-that the very process of going private and "squeezing out"
minority shareholders was some sort of deceptive or fraudulent
conduct that, regardless of the extent of disclosure, should be prohibited by the federal securities laws. When the Supreme Court
decided Santa Fe and restricted private litigants to whatever
remedies they might obtain under applicable state law, the SEC
proposed a rather broad rule, under the guise of disclosure, that
would have substantially restricted the ability to go private.23 After
numerous objections to that proposal, a rule was adopted that is
less extreme but still creates substantial disclosure impediments for
a corporation desiring to go private.2 This seems quite clearly the
sort of case that the proponents of a federal incorporation statute
would allow the SEC to regulate directly. Those proponents apparently assume that, if there were a federal incorporation statute,
the SEC and private litigants could then move directly to prevent
these perceived abuses, without being forced to frame their objections in a manner that invokes a statute fundamentally oriented
toward disclosure.2
A second camp, generally perceived as less extreme, urges not
federal incorporation, but rather a federal "minimum standards"
test. Such an approach, presumably patterned after statutes such as
the California "pseudo-foreign corporation" statute, 26 would require
22430
23

U.S. 462 (1977).

Proposed Rule-Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their
Affiliates, 42 Fed. Beg. 60,090, 60,101 (1977).
24 Rule 13e-3, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736, 46,741 (1979) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-3).
25Some support for federal incorporation is inevitably provided by the
questionable approach adopted in California, which seeks to apply certain portions
of its corporations code to corporations incorporated in other jurisdictions, notwithstanding the potential for direct conflict with the law of the incorporating jurisdiction. See CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 2115 (West Supp. 1980).
26 Id.
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that all corporations adhere to some minimum standards in matters
of fundamental importance-at least as identified by the supporters
of this notion-and that more mundane matters be left to separate
state regulation. The third group, of course, supports retention of
the status quo, allowing all substantive matters of internal corporate
affairs to be regulated by the states.
And yet, most of the rhetoric surrounding these disputes seems
misguided. Plainly, it makes little sense for a large corporate body
to be able to choose which of fifty different corporation laws will
be applied to it. Why should a corporation headquartered in Los
Angeles with sales to all fifty states as well as the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and foreign nations, with offices scattered
throughout the country and the world, with thousands of employees,
have the right to select from among the fifty sets of laws that which
will govern its internal operations and its relationships with its
shareholders? Why should a corporation headquartered in Wyoming with ten shareholders, five employees, and no sales outside the
city of Rawlins be allowed to decide that its affairs will be governed
by laws of the state of Maryland? Why should the filing of a piece
of paper called the "Articles of Incorporation" or "Certificate of
Incorporation" in one state rather than another lead to different
conclusions about what matters must be submitted to a vote by
shareholders, what percentage of votes is required for approval, and
the like? On its face, that notion makes no sense, and I do not
believe that the defenders of the present system (except Delaware
and the few other states that are popular states of incorporation)
can seriously argue for the sanity of that process.
At the same time, however, why would movement toward federal incorporation necessarily produce any increase in the SEC's
jurisdiction? The filing of documents of incorporation in the
states is currently a purely ministerial function. The states do
not enforce these corporation laws. Although virtually all states
have laws regulating securities-most of them more directly regulatory than the federal securities laws-few, if any, of the state securities administrators are charged with direct enforcement of the
corporation laws. If a corporation violates the corporation law,
challenging that violation is invariably left to individual plaintiffs.
The state attorney general may, under unusual circumstances, be
authorized to bring an action, but such actions are extremely rare.
One must therefore question the assumption that federal incorporation carries with it an expansion of the jurisdiction of the
SEC. Why could not a federal incorporation statute require filing
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of articles of incorporation in the national archives without enlarging the SEC's jurisdiction one iota? Yet the debate rages on,
with the sensible notion of federal incorporation inextricably
linked to the objectionable (to many) notion of expansion of SEC
authority. And, as Professor Kripke notes, 27 this linkage apparently
has developed solely because the SEC has so zealously advanced its
arguments for disclosure that few people seem capable of considering federal incorporation without assuming a substantial
increase of SEC enforcement power.
This brief discussion may seem to have strayed rather far
from the topic of Professor Kripke's book. But in a curious way,
it highlights much of the thrust of the work. For if Professor
Kripke's views are accepted, then much of the modern disclosure
mechanism may be seen to serve little useful purpose other than
to regulate behavior by those who must disclose. If that disclosure
process has given the SEC license to create new substantive norms
for behavior, then the system may not merely be faulty, but may
be affirmatively harmful.
Consider again the "sensitive payment" issue and the SEC's
position, of which Professor Kripke seems clearly to disapprove.
Ignoring for the moment the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,2 and with it the congressional ratification of
the SEC's views, the Commission's accomplishments in the "sensitive payment" cases are remarkable. Although this is not the place
for an examination of either the propriety of the SEC's views or
their implications for the future, it may be accepted, for purposes
of this discussion, that for decades multinational corporations in
this 'country made payments in foreign countries to agents who
assisted them in obtaining important contracts. Let it be assumed
-as was dearly true in some of those cases-that the agents in turn
made payments to government officials, which were not illegal
under the laws of the foreign country, and were actually condoned
because of historical practice. Furthermore, American-based multinational corporations were competing with foreign corporations;
which were following the same procedures while competing for the
same contracts. In the rash of new morality that followed Witergate, the SEC decided that those practices were improper and that,
whether or not legal in the foreign countries, they were matters requiring disclosure. Indeed, even if the amounts and contracts
27

E.g., H. KnRwE, supra note 2, at 37-39.

28 hab. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (1976)).
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involved were economically immaterial, these practices had to be
disclosed because they reflected upon the "morality of management." The SEC's position was simply that "shareholders are
entitled to know that people of this kind are running the corporation." (It is not irrelevant that at least one acquaintance of mine
suggested that, given the environment in many foreign countries,
he would be more concerned if management were unwilling to
make such payments.) Through this rather tangential link to the
disclosure mechanism, the SEC obtained significant results, primarily through consent decrees, and created havoc for many multinationals. Although the Commission was able to convince trial
courts that its concerns were not beyond its jurisdiction, 9 its approach has not yet been approved by the Supreme Court, which
has generally been hostile to the SEC's recent attempts to expand
its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it occurred; the SEC was in fact
victorious and had a substantial impact on the manner in which
multinational corporations conduct their business-all of this on
the basis of a rather attenuated relationship to a principle of disclosure.
Issues such as that of foreign payments undoubtedly are exciting, enervating, and headline-grabbing. The SEC's subsequent
attack on management perquisites was of a similar nature. But if,
in administering its disclosure statutes, the SEC focuses upon such
matters as foreign payments, management perquisites, protection
of minority shareholders from the presumed outrage of going private, and the like, it is no wonder that the SEC has failed to lead
any movement toward the kind of disclosure that Professor Kripke
so forcefully argues is important to investors. For one can rationally infer from recent history that the Commission's concern
in administering the disclosure statutes, for the most part, is no
longer with providing useful information to potential investors,
but rather is with protecting substantive rights of investors, and
primarily minority shareholders, against what it sees as wrongful
corporate behavior.
I do not presume here to stand in judgment of the propriety
of the SEC's views. Certainly, a large element of unfairness was
present in most of the cases that have been brought or supported
by the SEC. Corporate insiders were improperly taking advantage
of the corporation and concealing that fact from the corporate
owners-though often not in ways that materially affected the financial statements of the enterprises. My point is simply the juris2

9 See SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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dictional one. Although the SEC may have decided that, together
with the federal courts, it has the power to right all wrongs,30
that power is nowhere to be found in the securities laws. The
orientation of the SEC, as Professor Kripke would have it, should
be directed toward providing investors with useful corporate information from which to make reasonable investment decisions,
and not toward protecting the public from corporate wrongdoing of
whatever nature. I do not suggest that the SEC should be less
than diligent in its enforcement activities. I do, however, suggest
that all of the SEC's activities should be coordinated with the
purposes for which the securities laws were adopted. Insofar as
the securities laws affect securities exchanges, securities institutions,
and securities professionals, they are in fact designed as regulatory
statutes and have properly been so approached. Those activities
of the SEC are beyond the scope of both Professor Kripke's book
and this review. The securities laws are not, however, designed to
regulate corporate conduct in general.
Although the report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure was disappointing to Professor Kripke and indeed provided much of the impetus for his important book, it was perhaps
a significant step. In many respects, the report may be seen at
least as an attempt to focus upon the true disclosure issues and the
true purpose of the Commission. Professor Kripke's work, a powerful and thoughtful document, will, I hope, spur the Commission to
recognize that the Advisory Committee's task remains unfinished and
cause it to direct more of its attention to those fundamental issues.
30 See Solon Agrees to Fay
t$900,000 That SEC Says It Owes Lessors, Wall
St. J., Apr. 26, 1977, at 3, col 5, describing a rather remarkable remedy obtained
pursuant to the power of the federal courts to "right all wrongs."

